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Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the
World: Private Enforcement in a Global
Market1
2
By Clifford A. Jones

I. The Domestic Market: The Sherman Act and the

Early History of Private Enforcement
At the time of its adoption, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of
1890 ("Sherman Act") was unique in its scope and remedies even
though it was said to represent a federal declaration of illegality of
practices that the common law of England and the American states
"had always prohibited.",3 The American states had a history of
enforcing antitrust laws even prior to the adoption of the Sherman

1 Portions of this paper draw on the following works: CLIFFORD A. JONES,
EU, UK, AND USA (1999)
LAW]; CLIFFORD A. JONES,

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN THE

[hereinafter PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMP.

Trilateralismin Private Antitrust Enforcement: Japan, the USA, and the European
Union, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 211-224 (C.A.
Jones & M. Matsushita eds., 2002) [hereinafter Trilateralism in Private Antitrust
Enforcement]; CLIFFORD A. JONES, A New Dawn for Private Competition Law
Remedies in Europe? Reflections from the USA, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
ANNUAL 2001: EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW 95-108

(C. Ehlermann & I. Atanasiu eds., 2003) [hereinafter New Dawn for Private Comp.
Law Remedies].
2 Visiting Lecturer in Law at the University of Florida's Frederic G. Levin
College of Law. Professor Jones received his J.D. from the University of Oklahoma
and his M.Phil. and Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge. Professor Jones is
also a former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Fellow in the Programme in
Comparative Media Law and Policy, University of Oxford.
3 W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 18, 98 (1965). Senator J. Sherman, in a speech to
the U.S. Senate, 21 CONG. REC. 3: 2456-7 (Mar. 21, 1890), stated that "[iut does not
announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized principles of
the common law....
." Ironically, Senator Sherman's view of English common law
in this area seems to have been mistaken. Letwin, supra, at 51-52.
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5
Act,4 and the now internationally famous treble damage remedy
ironically was modeled 6 on the (imported) treble damage provisions
of the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623. The treble damages
and attorney fee provisions were inserted in the Sherman Act to
encourage private plaintiffs to bring suit, given the likely difficulties
of proof and the small size of any one trader's damages.7
Although the American treble damage remedy is perceived by
some as a tool to punish, the better view is that its purposes are
compensatoryg or serve the dual goals of deterrence and
compensation. 9 The perception that the new antitrust legislation was
vigorously enforced from the outset derives from a few high-profile
cases.' 0 In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") did not
receive any funds specifically appropriated to enforce the Sherman
Act until 1903, some 13 years after its enactment, and in the same
period, only 23 federal government actions (an average of 1.77 per
year) were brought. 1
In the first 50 years of the Sherman Act, only 175 private
actions (an average of 3.5 per year) were brought and only 13 were
recorded as successful.' 2 This number accelerated greatly from 1941

4

H.B.

THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN

AMERICAN TRADITION

155 (1954).

5

15 U.S.C. § 15 (2004).

6

THORELLI,

supra note 4, at 213. Even more ironically, some 65 different

English enactments once provided for double, treble, or quadruple damages. BMW
of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580-81 (1996).
7 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMP. LAW, supra note 1, at 80.

8 L. Void, Are Threefold Damages Under The Antitrust Act Penal Or
Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117, 157-58 (1940).
9 See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328, 330 (1990);
California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989); Am. Soc'y of Mech.
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 557 (1982); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746,
748, 749 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486
(1977); Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
'o E.g., Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); and United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85
F. 271 (1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
1 THORELLI,

supra note 4, at 588, 590.

12 REPORT OF THE

U.S.

ATr'y GEN. NAT'L COMM'N TO STUDY

THE

ANTITRUST LAWS, 378 (1955). The records do not account for settled cases that
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to 1985, during which time 29,588 private actions were commenced
(increasing the average to 657.5 per year, although the numbers were
much smaller in earlier years)-a statistical explosion.' 4 However,
one practitioner reckoned that through 1946, there were only ten
actual treble damage awards and "treble damages suits did not get
started until after the Supreme Court had formulated the rules for the
proof of damages in the Bigelow case.,"15 New private actions
commenced in the United States from 1996 to 2000 averaged 674 per
year, with 858 cases filed in 2000 alone. 16 In contrast, the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ averaged 25 civil cases and 52 criminal cases
filed per year over the same period.' 7 Uniquely in the world, private
actions brought in the United States historically appear to maintain a
nearly 10 to 1 ratio to government enforcement efforts, greater when
only criminal cases are considered, despite the changes in U.S.
antitrust law and policy that we have seen since the late 1970s.
Private actions have proven to be effective measures to secure
compensation for antitrust victims that would otherwise not be
forthcoming. Although the litigation in United States v. IBM Corp.
(six years from complaint to trial and six more years of trial before
being dismissed on a stipulation that it was "without merit")
represents the nadir of U.S. governmental antitrust litigation, private
litigation has often been successful.' 8 Even in the IBM litigation,
while the government dismissed its case in 1982, "by 1973 Control

may have been in fact successful. Another estimate concluded that, from 1890 to
1940, there were 423 private cases brought. Richard Posner, A Statistical Study of
Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 371 (1970).
13 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (1941-1985).
14 Id.
15 Nolo Contendere and Private Antitrust Enforcement: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong. 7-8 (1966) (statement of T.C. McConnell, referring to Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946)).
16 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2000, Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, 139 (Washington, D.C., Superintendent of Documents
2000), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000 (last visited May 31,
2001).
17 ANTITRUST DIvISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1994-2003, Antitrust
Division,
U.S.
Department
of
Justice
(2003),
available
at
http://www.udoj.gov/atr/public/12848.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
18 See PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMP. LAW, supra note 1, at 83-84. The
private actions against IBM were tried in six months.
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Data had already settled its private monopolization action against
IBM for upwards of $100 million," and "senior officers of Control
Data boasted that the lawsuit had been the best investment the
company had ever made."'19 More successful private litigation
resulted from the heavy electrical equipment price-fixing convictions
in the early 1960s. These suits produced 2,233 private actions and
settlements of "upwards of $350 million" by General Electric and
others, providing the "real bite.
More recently, private damage
settlements involving the international vitamins price-fixing cartel
and others in excess of $1 billion have been reached. 2 1 However,
settlement numbers are not necessarily or even usually treble in
amount, but are more likely to represent single damages and perhaps
attorney fees, as occurred in the corrugated cardboard price-fixing
private actions. In the U.S. Microsoft litigation, private litigation so
far has produced settlements totaling at least $1.5 billion.23

II. The Early Exports: Footholds in Foreign Markets
The early history of U.S. antitrust law and policy reflects a
primary concern for the domestic market and an initial reluctance to
intervene in foreign anticompetitive arrangements.24 The DOJ's
19M. HANDLER, R. PITOFSKY, H. GOLDSCHMID & D. WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 124 (1997).
20 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMP. LAW, supra note 1

(citing HANDLER, ET.
AL., supra note 19). Of course, in the early 1960s, $350 million was real money.
21 See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in
Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT
22

L. REv. 207 (2003).

S.D. Susman, Mandatory Treble Damages-Time For a New Look?,

COMM'N ON CORPORATE AND ANTITRUST LAW OF THE SECTION OF CORPORATION,
BANKING, AND BUSINESS LAW, American Bar Association Annual Meeting (New

Orleans, 1981) reprinted as an attachment in Antitrust Damage Allocation:

Hearings before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 170-177 (1981-82)
(statement of J. Sims).
23 S.Regan, Microsoft antitrust trial starts in Minnesota, REUTERS, Mar. 16,
2004, available at http://www.reuters.com/locales/newsArticle.jsp;:4056e929:
aaaaadad923762af?type=technologyNews&locale=enIN&storyID=4573599
(last
visited Mar. 18, 2004).
2 See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)
(Sherman Act inapplicable to foreign conduct); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927) (Sherman Act applies so long as some of defendants'
conduct occurred in U.S. and affected domestic commerce); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (Sherman Act applies
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interest in international cartels increased with the appointment of
Thurman Arnold to head the Antitrust Division in 1938. And, the
growing revelations of pre-war cartels, in which some American
firms participated,25 gave impetus to more intense scrutiny of the
international conduct of firms and new efforts to export antitrust laws
to foreign nations. The existence of international cartels and their
support of, inter alia, Nazi Germany once prompted U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to propose curbing them through the United
Nations. 26 A brief review of the U.S.-encouraged growth of antitrust
laws in foreign countries is worthwhile because, until foreign
antitrust laws exist, it follows that no private enforcement of antitrust
law in foreign countries will occur.
The dominant role of cartels in the economic development of
Europe is well known,27 and prior to 1945, economy by cartels, then
conceived of in Europe as respected economic institutions, was the
rule.28 The German Cartel Decree of 1923, although ostensibly
designed to control cartels in the public interest, served merely to
complete the cartelization of the German economy. By 1936, 3,000
cartels existed in Germany and individual firms had lost the right to
not participate in a cartel. 29 The Allied occupation of Germany
following World War II included a decartelization plan. When the
"Schuman Plan" for the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community (1952-2002) ("ECSC") was presented to U.S. Secretary
of State, Dean Acheson, on May 7, 1950, Acheson's first reaction
that the plan was a clever cover for a "gigantic European
was fear
' 31
cartel.
so long as foreign conduct intended to and did affect commerce in the United
States) [hereinafter "Alcoa"].
25 Tony Freyer, Antitrust and Bilateralism: The US, Japanese, and EU
Comparative and Historical Relationships, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 3, 14-15 (C.A. Jones & M. Matsushita eds., 2002).
26 See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO:
Forgingthe Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 2 (1995).
generally Clive Trebilcock, THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE
27 See

CONTINENTAL POWERS 1780-1914 (1981).

H.G. Schriter, Cartelizationand Decartelization in Europe, 1870-1995, 25
J. EUROPEAN ECON. HIST. 129, 137 (1996). See also PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
COMP. LAW, supra,note 1, at 23-28.
29 J. Ferry, How Do We Get There From Here?-FutureCompetition Policy in
28

the EEC, 11 FOrQHAM CORP. L. INST. 643, 647 (1984).
30

DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE

DEPARTMENT 383 (1969). D. DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION? 23 (1994). Acheson
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After the war, the United States pressured its European allies,
such as the United Kingdom 3 1 and Australia, as well as the recently
defeated Japan 32 and Germany, to adopt antitrust laws. Japan, then
under occupation, was the first to do so, adopting its Anti-Monopoly
Act ("AMA") in 1947. In the United Kingdom, the Sherman Act
prohibition model was rejected in favor of an "abuse" system under
the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act
of 1948, which required the approval of Parliament before any
remedy (limited to injunction) could be ordered. 33 This so-called
"puny infant" was radically altered and essentially supplanted by the
Competition Act of 1998, which adopted the prohibition approach
and.34text of the European Community ("EC") Treaty's Articles 81 and
82

The German Cartel Law followed the aforementioned ECSC
Treaty and its broader counterpart, the EC Treaty. Jean Monnet, first
President of the ECSC's High Authority, described the antitrust
provisions of the ECSC Treaty by stating that, "For Europe, they
were a fundamental innovation: the extensive antitrust legislation
now applied by the European Community essentially derives from
those few lines in the Schuman Treaty." 35 The competition provisions
of the EC Treaty closely follow the ECSC Treaty and bear the
feared objections by the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, which took a dim view of
cartels controlling essential war material in fight of then recent experience with the
powerful cartelized German economy. The now-defunct ECSC placed coal and
steel in the then six Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg) under the supranational control of the High
Authority in order to make war impossible. The coal and steel industries of the
members were essentially administered by the High Authority as to production,
allocation, employment, pricing, and quotas. Coal and steel now fall under the
general EC Treaty.
31 See generally TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST
IN

GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA, 1880-1990, 234-268 (1992).
32 J.0. Haley, Harmonized Rules, Peculiar Laws: Recent Developments in
Japanese Law, in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES 137, 140 (R. Zdch ed.,

1999).
33 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMP. LAW, supra note 1, at 36-39.
34 Id. at 36-40.
35 JEAN MONNET, MEMOIRS 352-3 [R. Mayne trans.] (1978). Compare Article

65 of the Treaty Instituting the ECSC, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 143, with
Article 81 of the Treaty Establishing the EC, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997).
Monnet noted that Robert Bowie, the drafter of the Treaty provisions, was a "young
Harvard professor.. .who was said to be the leading expert on US anti-trust
legislation, which the Americans applied as rigorously as morality itself."
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substantive imprint of the Sherman Act derived from their American
ancestry. 36 Moreover, the gradual expansion of the European
Community has thus spread the competition rules derived from
Robert Bowie's "few lines in the Schuman Treaty" to many more
countries.
The later EC Treaty version of Section 1 reflects a substantive summary of
judicial authority under the Sherman and Clayton Acts version:
36

The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market; all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall
be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph
inapplicable in the case of:
-any

agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;

-any
decision
undertakings;
-any

1 may, however, be declared

or category

of decisions by

associations

of

concerted practice or category of concerted practices;

which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
EC

TREATY

art. 8 1.
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From the "Six" original members in 1952 (France, Germany,
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) to the addition of The
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973, Greece (1981),
Spain and Portugal (1986), and Austria, Sweden, and Finland (1995),
the European Community now stands at fifteen. The May 1, 2004
addition of Poland, the Czech Republic, Malta, Cyprus, Latvia,
Estonia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary brings
the total to twenty-five countries in which EC competition law is
directly applicable and directly effective. Moreover, May 1, 2004 was
the effective date of the new EC Competition Regulation 1/2003
("Reg. 1"), 37 which substantially revises EC competition law with the
procedural and substantive changes in the last
first major non-merger
38
years.
forty
Under Article 3 of Reg. 1, national competition authorities
who wish to apply their national competition laws to conduct
affecting trade between the Member States must also apply Article
81-2 EC and, with some exceptions, must not prohibit what EC law
permits. This "Siamese Twin" clause, because national and EC law
may be seen as joined at the hip, places additional pressure on
Member States to conform their national laws to the competition
provisions of the EC Treaty. 39 Most important, national competition
authorities will now be applying EC law themselves in addition to the
Commission's enforcement activities, and national courts will now be
applying the full scope of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty,
instead of being limited by the Commission's prior monopoly on the
application of Article 81(3), the exemption provisions. Other
longer-term candidate Member States (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey,
Croatia, and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia) and
European Free Trade Area ("EFTA") states (Iceland, Norway,
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty," 2003 O.J. (L 1), 1 [hereinafter "Reg. 1"].
38 See generally Clifford A. Jones, The Second Devolution of European
37

Competition Law: Empowering National Courts, National Authorities, and Private
Litigants in the Expanding European Union, Paper presented at the European
Union Studies Association Conference (Nashville, Tennessee, Mar. 29, 2003) (On
file with the author and the European Union Studies Association).
39 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
40 For a discussion of the issues surrounding pluralistic enforcement where the
Commission held a monopoly on the application of Article 81(3), see PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF COMP. LAW, supra note 1, at 93-112.
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Liechtenstein) also apply the substance of EC law either under the
European Economic Area Agreement, 4' or under association
agreements with the EC. In short, more than thirty countries in
Europe now have antitrust laws that are nearly identical to the EC
Treaty competition rules, and more may come.
The post World War II efforts of the United States to export
antitrust to the world were not limited to the group of countries
mentioned above. In an effort to reform the global economy, trade,
competition, and financial aspects, the United States proposed the illfated Havana Charter,42 the demise of which caused the International
Trade Organization to be stillborn in the late 1940s. The antitrust
code included in that agreement was never incorporated into the
surviving patchwork, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") or its successor under the World Trade Organization
("WTO"). Since the Singapore Ministerial Conference (1996) of the
WTO, various countries have worked toward inclusion of antitrust
rules in some form under the WTO.4 3 Agreement was reached to
place the issue on the agenda for the Doha ("Millennium") Round of
WTO negotiations 44 and the Doha Declaration stated that
negotiations on that topic would begin at a time to be specified during
the Round. However, the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in September
2003, broke up without agreement, and the status of the negotiations
is still unclear.
The WTO consists of about 145 countries of which
approximately 90 now have antitrust laws in some form.45 While not
all foreign antitrust laws contain explicit provisions for private
enforcement, some, such as Canada4 6 and Japan, 47 do. And, the large
41

See T.C. Hartley, FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 5 (4th ed.

1998).
42 HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, Mar.

24, 1948, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948).
43 See generally Trilateralismin Private Enforcement, supra note 1.
44 C.A. Jones & M. Matsushita, Global Antitrust in the Millennium Round:
The Ways Forward, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM,
398 (Jones & Matsushita eds., 2002).
41 Id. at

402.

46 Charles M. Wright & Matthew D. Baer, Price-fixing Class Actions: A
CanadianPerspective, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 463 (2004).
47 S. Seryo, Private Enforcement and New Provisions for Damages and
Injunctions in Japan, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM,

255-291 (Jones & Matsushita eds., 2002).

418

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 16: 4

bloc of countries comprising the EC allow for damage actions and
injunctions by implication from the combination of directly effective
48
Treaty rights and national and Community remedy principles.
While the pace of private enforcement exports has not
matched the level of substantive growth in antitrust laws across the
globe, private enforcement also lagged behind government
enforcement in the United States for many years, even when the
statutory basis for private enforcement was clear and explicit. In the
case of the EC-bloc of countries, competition laws have been seen for
over forty years as the exclusive province of government enforcers
and the notion of private enforcement still appears in some quarters
as not Tuite right. While time, and perhaps a few successful private
actions, 9 likely will result in some attitude adjustment, the private
remedy is thus far not a material factor under most foreign antitrust
laws, with the possible exception of Canada. The principle is there,
but the practice does not yet exist.

III. The Difficult Years: Extraterritoriality & Blocking
Statutes
In the post-Alcoa world of the effects doctrine, increasingly
aggressive U.S. antitrust enforcement began to create friction with
some of our closest allies and greatest trading partners. The Canadian
provinces of Ontario and Quebec enacted the first blocking statutes in
response to the U.S. investigation in the late 1940s into the Canadian
paper industry. 5° In the 1950s, Canada reacted negatively to a U.S.
investigation into a Canadian radio and television patent pool
designed to exclude U.S. manufacturers from the Canadian market.5 '
And, in the 1970s the Uranium litigation 52 created perhaps even

48

See PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMP. LAW, supra note 1, at 45-78, for a

detailed explanation of the road from general Community law principles of direct
effect and supremacy to the recognition of private damages actions for breach of
Community competition rules. More recently and definitively, see Case C-453/99,
Courage v. Crehan, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6314.
49 See Donncadh Woods, Private Enforcement of Antitrust RulesModernization of the EU Rules and the Road Ahead, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.

431 (2004), for examples of a few actions resulting in damage awards in the EU.
50

C. Stark, Improving Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation, in COMPETITION

51

(Jones & Matsushita eds., 2002).
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).

52

See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1252, 1261 (7th

POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, 83, 84
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greater conflict. 53 In 1976, Canada enacted an important competition
law that has in some respects brought it closer to the U.S. model by
adoptinf a prohibition approach to certain practices such as pricefixing.
The Uranium litigation was apparently the impetus for the
United Kingdom's adoption of a blocking statute, the Protection of
Trading Interests Act of 1980. This Act essentially prohibited U.K.
courts from compelling the production of U.K.-located documents,
assisting in the enforcement of treble damage judgments, and
provided that U.K. nationality defendants could "claw-back" from the
assets located in the U.K. of foreign companies any excess over
actual damages in a judgment obtained abroad. The target was clearly
U.S. antitrust treble damage actions, although the statute does not
explicitly say so.
Among the most bizarre procedural sagas was the Laker
Airways antitrust litigation in the 1980s, several cases involving Sir
Freddie Laker, a principal in Laker Airlines, a low-cost trans-Atlantic
carrier that failed due to an alleged conspiracy among other airlines
(including British Airways, and Sabena) and banks to exclude Laker
Airlines from the market. A multitude of diverse litigation ensued in
55
which Laker filed suit in the United States under the Sherman Act,
Midland Bank filed suit in the United Kingdom to keep Laker from
continuing his suit in the United States, and obtained an injunction to
that effect from the U.K. Court of Appeal.56 However, a similar order

Cir. 1980), where the court considered issues raised by the governments of
Australia, Canada, South Africa, and Great Britain as to whether the district court
could proceed in a case brought by Westinghouse Electric Corporation alleging
antitrust violations against 26 foreign and domestic uranium producers. Plaintiffs
antitrust action against 12 foreign and 17 domestic corporations engaged in various
aspects of the uranium industry obtained final default judgments as to liability
against nine defaulting defendants in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, and also obtained injunctions prohibiting various
defaulting defendants from transferring funds out of the United States without
approval by the court upon 20 days prior, written notice. See also Rio Tinto Zinc v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977).
53 See Stark, supra note 50.
54 Wright & Baer, supra note 46.
55 E.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
56 Midland Bank PLC v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1986] Q.B. 689, [1986] 1 All
E.R. 526 (Q.B. 1986).
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in favor of British Airways was reversed by the House of Lords. 57
The private cases ultimately settled, and the U.S. government
discontinued its criminal grand jury investigation against British
Airways and others on diplomatic grounds at the request of the U.K.
Prime Minister.
After these controversial cases, the DOJ has concentrated on
negotiating international
antitrust enforcement
cooperation
agreements with foreign countries and now has agreements with
Germany, Australia, Canada, the European Union ("EU"), Brazil,
Israel, Japan, and Mexico.58 While these agreements do not affect
private litigation, they indicate that tensions related to extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. antitrust law have eased as other jurisdictions
have become more cognizant of the need for antitrust enforcement.
Moreover, since the59 EU has adopted something akin to the U.S.
"effects" doctrine,
what once seemed to be unjustified
extraterritoriality on the part of the United States has become more
internationally accepted.

IV. The Global Bull Market For Private Enforcement
& Obstacles
Given the vast spread of antitrust laws in the global market,
the question naturally arises as to why nothing equivalent to the U.S.
level of private actions has evolved in foreign jurisdictions. However,
60
this bull market is fairly recent and the time lag is not out of line
with similar experiences within the United States. 6 ' Most of the
comparisons here are directed toward the United States and the EU
because the countries applying EU antitrust laws represents the

British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1985] A.C. 58, [1984] 3 All
E.R. 39 (H.L. 1984).
58 Stark, supra note 50.
57

59 See Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Comm'n, 1972 E.C.R. 619,
[1972] C.M.L.R. 557 (1972) (the "Dye-stuffs" case) (economic entity doctrine);
Case 89/85, A. Ahlstr6m OY v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R.
901 (1988) (the "Woodpulp" case) (community implementation doctrine); Case T102/96, Gencor v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 971 (1999)
(merger jurisdiction). Any difference between the U.S. "effects" doctrine and the
formulations in Dyestuffs and Woodpulp is not apparent to the Commission.
60 See supra text accompanying note 10.
61

note 1.
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largest such group in the world. Some of the following comments
have general application, with particular points made about Japan,
Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Every competition lawyer and official in Europe knows that
the U.S. system offers treble damages, class actions, and contingency
fees,62 and successful private litigation in the United States is often
attributed to these factors. The argument goes that until these aspects
of the system are available in foreign jurisdictions, it is simply not
worth considering expensive, uncertain private actions. However, this
is not automatically the case, and legal advisors must be willing to
evaluate particular private antitrust actions to determine if the likely
outcome is worth the expense.
A brief discussion of some comparative remedies issues may
be helpful in analyzing the prospects for private litigation abroad.
Perhaps the single, most-often given reason for the lack of private
actions abroad is the absence of the treble damage remedy. This
explanation is given far too much weight, especially in Europe and in
any jurisdiction where prejudgment interest is available, as discussed
below.
A. Damages
In Europe, the Court of Justice ("ECJ") has made it clear that
damages are available as a matter of Community law to persons and
undertakings suffering injury from infringements of the competition
provisions of the EC Treaty.63 It is submitted that the relatively strict
rules of damages applied in the European Court's Article 288 EC
jurisprudence are minimum standards, and outside the context of
the liability of Community institutions or Member States, more
generous standards may apply. 65 Even the Court's Article 288 EC
judgments have recognized and applied the concepts of reasonable
62

Contingency fees in antitrust cases are no longer common in the United

States with the exception of class actions.
63 See sources cited supra note 48.
64 "The limits laid down by the case law in regard to actions brought under
Article 215 [now 288] of the Treaty are in fact based on the widespread view that,
as a matter of principle, compensation may not be recovered for injury caused by
the legislature." Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur S.A. v.
Fed. Republic of Germany & Regina v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex pane,
Factortame Ltd. & Others, (Factortame III), [1996] Q.B. 404, at

64, [1996]

C.M.L.R. 889 (1996).
65

See PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

OF COMP. LAW,

supra note l,at 240-41.
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estimates of damages and "yardstick" measurements 66 applied in the
United States, so it appears that mainstays of private damage amount
calculations in the United States will be supported in Europe. 67 The
case law in Europe imposes the requirement that damages, when
available, must be adequate. 68 This also should be kept in mind when
considering the prejudgment interest issue.
While the United States has treble damages, Europe and other
jurisdictions do not. Foreign countries seem unlikely to have them in
the future, although the development of substantial enhancements is
not out of the question. However, this is not the end of the story until
attorneys have considered what measure of damages is to be trebled
in the United States against what can be awarded in the relevant
foreign jurisdiction. If single compensatory damages are adequate,
there should be no need for the treble damage inducement in the
Community and elsewhere. In the United States, it has long been
understood that the Sherman Act's "failure to provide for
prejudgment
interest is a shortcoming that leaves a plaintiff less than
69
whole."
The treble damage provision in the United States does not
fully overcome this flaw. As a result, studies have shown that at best
treble damages may offset the lack of prejudgment interest. One
70
study of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.
considered that "treble" damages awarded in that case amounted to
only twenty-three cents on the dollar due to the absence of
prejudgment interest. 7' Another study reached the conclusion that
"antitrust damages are currently not trebled" and that one can safely
"conclude that awarded [treble] damages are much more likely to be
72
the equivalent of actual damages than treble damages.,
66 A.G. Toth, The Concepts of damage and causality as elements of noncontractual liability, in T. HEUKELS & A. MCDONNELL, THE ACTION FOR
DAMAGES IN COMMUNITY LAW, 186-7 (1997).
67 See generally PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMP. LAW, supra note 1, chs.

17-19.
68

See Case 14/83, Von Colson und Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,

1984 E.C.R. 1891, at 28, [1986] C.M.L.R. 430 (1984).
69 Proving Antitrust Damages: Legal and economic issues, ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, 109 n.16 (1996).
70 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
71 V. SARRIS, THE EFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT:

THE

'ILLINOIS BRICK' DECISION, 17-18 (1984).
72

Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?
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As a result, the vision of windfall treble damages in the
United States perceived from abroad falls rather short of reality.
Litigants in Europe and elsewhere should concern themselves more
with what they can recover rather than what they cannot. Depending
on the length of time from injury to judgment and applicable interest
rates, the lack of prejudgment interest alone can reduce nominally
treble damages to single damages or less. Conversely, in jurisdictions
where prejudgment interest is available, the practical equivalent to
double or treble damages in the United States may be at hand.
Attorneys should do the arithmetic before concluding that the
absence of treble damages makes private damage actions
uneconomic.
B. Prejudgment Interest
In general, it is accepted by the Member States and the ECJ
that reparation for loss or damage includes an award of interest on the
principal sum. 7 3 In the second Marshalljudgment, the ECJ found that
Mrs. Marshall was entitled to receive interest on the award asyart
of
"4
full compensation for gender-based discrimination against her:
With regard to the second part of the second question
relating to the award of interest, suffice it to say that full
compensation for the loss and damage sustained as a result
of discriminatory dismissal cannot leave out of account
factors, such as the effluxion of time, which may in fact
reduce its value. The award of interest, in accordance with
the applicable national rules, must therefore be regarded as
an essential component of compensation for the purpose of
restoring real equality of treatment.75
Community antitrust actions may not offer "treble" damages,
but the following calculations show that they should offer adequate
and attractive compensation through prejudgment interest, which will
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 171 (1993).
73 Cf. A. van Casteren, Article 215(2) EC and the Question of Interest, in
T.
HEUKELS & A. MCDONNELL, THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES IN COMMUNITY LAW

199, 200 (1997) ("In national law, interest is considered an essential part of the
damages.").
74 Case C-271/91, M. Helen Marshall v. Southhampton and S.W. Hampshire
Area Health Auth. (MarshallI1), 1993 E.C.R. 1-4367, [1993] C.M.L.R. 293 (1993).
75 Id. at 31 (emphasis added). The interest in question included prejudgment
interest from the date of the discrimination.
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in many cases be the close equivalent of the U.S. treble damage
action. Accordingly, treble damage envy in the European Community
perhaps should be replaced by a lust for prejudgment interest that is
actually attainable.
76
C. Sample Damages Comparisons: Doing the Arithmetic

A couple of examples may help illustrate the comparison. If
we take as our starting point the $100,000,000 settlement (therefore
without any treble damages) received by Control Data from IBM in
1973 and treat it as denominated in Euros in 1995, this gives us a
base damages amount and a starting point in time. In Example 1, we
shall assume that national or European Community law permits as
part of compensation an award of prejudgment interest from the time
of injury to the time of judgment at the modest rate of seven percent
(7%), compounded annually. In Example IA, we shall assume that
the permitted prejudgment interest rate is a more generous fourteen
percent (14%) " based on an often cited, long range rate of return in
the U.S. stock market. A European court may be reluctant to use the
U.S. stock market as a basis, but EC law provides a basis for a
substantial, if not identical rate, if a European or other exchange does
not provide a similar rate of return. European Community legislation,
the "Late Payments Directive," establishes an interest rate for late
payments that is seven points above the European Central Bank's
refinancing rate78 and ought to assure an attractive prejudgment
interest award.

76

In the hands of the author, a spreadsheet may be a dangerous weapon, and

no warranty of accuracy or suitability is offered! An economist or accounting
expert witness normally may be used to present such calculations at trial.
77 Some may question whether a European court would allow such a high

interest rate. Unless national or Community law expressly fixes the appropriate
interest rate, I submit that this is a matter of persuasive advocacy and proof. The

rationale for allowing prejudgment interest is compensation for the time value of
money not received due to unlawful acts of defendants. If the evidence establishes
that such a rate of return reasonably could have been achieved in the appropriate
stock market over the appropriate period, the argument is that such a rate is
necessary to fully compensate plaintiff for the 'effluxion of time.' Marshall II,
1993 E.C.R. 1-4367,
31. Of course, other evidence, such as contractual
provisions, might also serve as the basis for arguing that a higher rate should be
used. The key is what rate fully compensates a plaintiff for lost use of money,
which in turn depends on what could have been earned elsewhere, even if the
elsewhere is a foreign stock market.
78 Council Directive, 2000/35/EC, art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 200) I(d).
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For purposes of Examples 1 and IA, we shall assume that
damages accrue evenly over a ten-year period from the beginning of
injury through litigation to judgment, prior to appeal. In other
words, assume injury first occurs in 1995 and accrues at the rate of
2.5 million Euros per calendar quarter. Imagine that the statute of
limitations is five years, suit is filed on the last day, and litigation
results in judgment after ten years.
Using these assumptions, we find that in Example 1 a nominal
damages sum of 100 million Euros results in an award of
compensation of 147.8 million Euros without treble damages or
costs, but based on prejudgment interest compounded annually at the
7% rate. Granted, this is not treble damages, but it is nearly 1.5 times
damages, which ought to be attractive.
On the other hand, Example IA applies the same assumptions
as Example 1 except that the interest rate used is 14% compounded
annually. That calculation results in a compensation award of 220.4
million Euros or about 2.2 times damages.
Both Example 1 and Example IA are in my view conservative
approaches. Neither is a full 3 times the award, but there is no magic
to the 3 times multiplier level as an incentive for clients to bring suit.
The original version in the Sherman Act provided for double
damages, but it was increased to three without any clear scientific
basis. Moreover, it may put this in perspective to consider the present
value of a U.S. treble damage award in comparison to these numbers.
A nominal 300 million Euros treble damage award, reduced to
present value at the 7% rate is 222.74 million Euros and at the 14%
rate is 133.1 million Euros. Therefore, the U.S. "treble" damage
award is less than it seems, and an equivalent actual damage award in
the EU or another jurisdiction permitting prejudgment interest is
more than expected.
Example 2 uses the same assumptions as Example 1, except
that compounding is quarterly and the full damages award is assumed
accrued in 1995. Similarly, Example 2A uses the same assumptions
as Example 1A except that compounding is quarterly, and the
damages are assumed already accrued. I consider Examples 2 and 2A
more realistic and typical. Compounding could arguably be done
monthly, weekly, or even daily under some types of financial
accounts or instruments, and advocates may be able to persuade the
judge that more frequent compounding is necessary to award full and

79 Postjudgment interest is not considered here.
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80

adequate compensation.
Under Example 2, the use of quarterly compounding and the
7% rate yields a combined damages and prejudgment interest award
of 214.2 million Euros, over two-thirds of a treble damage award.
Under Example 2A, the same approach at the 14% rate yields
compensation of 451.4 million Euros, or nearly 50 percent more than
treble damages. At the higher rate, EU law may offer 4.5 times
damages! It is submitted that litigants in the EU and elsewhere truly
do not need the Sherman Act multiplier to have adequate incentive to
sue forfull compensation.
Other jurisdictions vary on whether prejudgment interest is
allowed.
mlInsi81
d Japan, prejudgment interest is available but may be
limited to six percent. In Canada, prejudgment interest is available
"at a commercial rate from the date when the damage first began." 82
The United Kingdom and other Member States of the EU recognize
prejudgment interest, as does European Community law itself.83 A bit
of spreadsheet analysis may well persuade potential litigants that
what some of
treble damages as such are not required to encourage
84
our Canadian friends call the "private sheriff.,
While punitive damages are not available in antitrust cases in
the United States, Japan, 85 and most civil law jurisdictions, they are
available in principle in Canada86 and may become available in the
United Kingdom. ' At least in the context of jury trials, some
successful antitrust practitioners in the United States have expressed
a preference for punitive damages over the statutory treble damages

The more frequently the interest is compounded, the greater the amount of
interest that is added into the damages award. It may be wise to settle for a lower
interest rate but more frequent compounding of interest. I leave the actual
arithmetic as an exercise for the readers and their accountants!
81 Trilateralismin PrivateAntitrust Enforcement, supra note 1, at 221.
80

82

Wright & Baer, supra note 46, at 465.

83

See supra notes 73 and 77.

84 A. Neil Campbell & J. William Rowley, The Privatisationof Canadian
Competition Law Enforcement, GLOBAL COMPETMON REVIEW 26 (Aug. 2002),
available
at
http://www.mcmillanbinch.com/AboutUs.aspx?Sectionl=
AboutUs&Section2=Publication (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
85 Seryo, supra note 47.
86

See Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 (S.C. Can.).

87

Trilateralismin Private Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 1, at 232 & 246-
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remedy. 88 Moreover, when one considers the possibility of actual
damages to include pre-judgment interest combined with punitive
damages and costs, in some cases the remedy in Canada or Britain
and perhaps other jurisdictions
potentially could be more lucrative
89
than the Sherman Act allows.
D. Class Actions
Class actions are the usual vehicle in the United States for
aggregation of small consumer claims that would otherwise not be
substantial enough (at virtually any likely level of multiplication) to
justify the considerable expense of antitrust litigation. In the past, few
other jurisdictions offered such vehicles for consumer redress, but
signs show that this is beginning to change. As some Canadian
antitrust practitioners have noted, "U.S. exports to Canada are
booming in a niche market-class actions. From vitamins to
pharmaceuticals to polybutylene, Canadian class counsel are
importing U.S.-based lawsuits at an ever increasing rate." 90 While
class actions in the United States may not be numerically of great
importance, comprising about 20% of private actions, they have a
great deterrent effect because of the sheer size of a potential award of
aggregated claims.
Some countries are not adopting class actions as such but
something more akin to the U.S. parens patriae action where the
government (state, Member State, or national government as the case
may be) brings actions on behalf of its citizens and organizes the
distribution or cy pres use of the proceeds. In the United Kingdom,
the Enterprise Act of 2002 amended the Competition Act of 1998 to
provide for the designation of consumer organizations that can file
"Supercomplaints" with the competition authorities and obtain
damages where there has first been a governmental finding of
liability or infringement. 9' General legislation for "Group Litigation
Orders," a form of class action, exists, and this U.K. law remedy will
be available for competition cases under EC law because general EC
88

Id. at 240 n.45. Susman won a $347 million award (before trebling) in the

corrugated cardboard litigation.
89 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMP. LAW,

supra note 1, at 232-40.

90 D. Kent and H. Clarke, Class Actions CanadianStyle, CORP.
(Feb. 2003). See also Wright & Baer, supra note 46.
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91Individual plaintiffs may also bring such actions following a governmental
declaration of infringement. However, the requirement of an initial governmental
decision may actually deter private actions.
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law requires nondiscrimination in the U.K. legal system with regard
93
to claims based on EC law.92 In the EU, various directives in force
or proposed 94 already require the Member States to permit consumer
organizations to bring actions and obtain injunctions and some
require damages actions to be available. 95 It appears that EU-level
legislation on private antitrust remedies, perhaps to include some
form of class or representative actions, may be under consideration. 96
E. Other Issues
A variety of other issues often surface when comparing U.S.
private actions to those available in foreign courts. The right to
discovery is more extensive in the United States than anywhere else
in the world, at least for private actions. In the absence of effective
discovery rules, the number of successful private antitrust suits that
may be brought will be limited, perhaps to follow-on cases in the
wake of government actions or cases in which written agreements
establish the infringements. On the other hand, the EC Commission
itself never had oral deposition powers until the adoption of Reg.
1/2003. 9 Pretrial oral depositions are virtually unknown in civil law
systems, as well as in many common law systems. It will be difficult
to bring many types of private actions without this power or a
substantial equivalent because key evidence may often be solely
under the control of defendants' employees. At the same time,
American-style discovery rules are anathema in parts of the world, as
Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pdcheur S.A. v. Fed.
Republic of Germany & Regina v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte, Factortame
Ltd. & Others, (Factortame III), [1996] Q.B. 404, [1996] C.M.L.R. 889 (1996).
93 Council Directive 98/27/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51. See also Commission
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May
92

1998 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests (Codified version),
COM(03)241 final at 9 [hereinafter Injunctions].
94 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 30 January 2003 on Measures and Procedures to Ensure the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, COM(03)46 final. See especially
Articles 7-17, and 20 of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Proposal.

95 See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community
Patent, COM(00)412 final at Ch. IV, § 1,art. 30, 42 & 43.
96 See Clifford A. Jones, Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy
Analysis and Reality Check, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 13, 14 (2004). See also D.
Woods, supra note 49, at 444-48.
97 New Dawn for Private Comp. Law Remedies, supra note 1.
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the Uranium litigation showed. Fundamental changes are unlikely to
be made for competition cases only, so the future development of
more aggressive discovery methods is somewhat doubtful in the
absence of new legislation.
One bright spot on this issue and others is the increasing level
of private litigation in Canada, which has many similarities to the
United Kingdom, despite the lack of certain features of the U.S.
system. Plaintiffs in Canada seem to be overcoming limitations on
discovery and contingency fees as described elsewhere in this
symposium. 9 8 The issue of indirect purchaser standing, as seen in
Illinois Brick v. Illinois,99 seems to be only an issue in the United
States. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that indirect purchasers
of price-fixed goods could not sue to recover damages for the inflated
prices, and that only direct purchasers could do so. Canada has so far
rejected the Illinois Brick limitation, 00 as has Japan,' 0 ' and the EU
probably will as well. 10 2 Canada lacks treble damages, but has class
actions, prejudgment interest, and punitive damages. Canada has
European-style cost rules, but this does not seem to have prevented a
growing number of private damages class actions from taking place
there.'I0 Some observers believe that the "English Rule," meaning
that the loser pays the winner's costs and attorneys' fees, at least in
part, suppresses private antitrust litigation in Europe. However, I
believe that this is not the case. While possible, such a large
percentage of this type of litigation is settled that it is doubtful that
the costs rules have a decisive role.

V. Conclusion
The export of antitrust from the United States is gradually
being followed by the increasing export of private enforcement
actions to the foreign courtrooms of the world. As more countries
seek to expand the implementation and enforcement of antitrust rules,
they increasingly realize that supplemental private enforcement is

98 See generally Wright & Baer, supra note 46.
99 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
100 See Chadha v. Bayer, [1999] 45 O.R.3d 29.
101 Seryo, supra note 47.
102

The case for non-adoption in Europe is argued in PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

OFCOMP. LAW, supra note 1, at 193-98.
'03 See generally Wright & Baer, supra note 46.
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needed to provide effective levels of enforcement and in particular to
compensate victims as well as deter violators. While the United
States is still superior as a venue for private damage actions, the
courtrooms of the world are improving, and I think it is mostly a
matter of time (and perhaps some legislation) before private litigation
becomes effective abroad. A 10 to 1, private to public ratio of cases is
not required in order to consider the coming bull market in private
enforcement a success.
Finally, at this writing, the United States Supreme Court has
heard oral argument in Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffinan-LaRoche,
Ltd.104 on April 26, 2004, and is likely to decide the case this term.
The case in Empagran presents the question of whether foreign
plaintiffs who were injured outside the United States by antitrust
violations (the Vitamins cartel) directed to the U.S. market may sue
in the United States under the Sherman Act. The foreign remedy at
present is mostly theoretical, and if the Empagran plaintiffs are
excluded from suing in the United States, they will likely be left
without a meaningful damages remedy despite being victims of one
of the most egregious antitrust violations in history. If Empagran is
affirmed, then other antitrust jurisdictions may be encouraged to
continue to develop effective private remedies in their own markets
so that their citizens need not depend on the United States for
compensation.1 ° 5 In a global market, the export of private actions
must be expanded for the benefit of the United States as well as the
rest of the world.

104 Empagran

S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 966 (2003).
105 One might also argue that the affirmance of Empagran would send the
message that countries need not provide private remedies since U.S. courts are
open to their citizens in some cases. While this is possible, I prefer to think that
countries will be more likely to follow up their adoption of antitrust laws by
enhancing private enforcement in their own courts.

